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We introduce wage setting via e¢ ciency wages in the neoclassical one-sector
growth model to study the growth e¤ects of wage inertia. We compare the dynamic
equilibrium of an economy with wage inertia with the equilibrium of an economy
without wage inertia. We show that wage inertia a¤ects the long run employment
rate and that the transitional dynamics of the main economic variables will be
di¤erent because wages are a state variable when wage inertia is introduced. In
particular, we show non-monotonic transitions in the economy with wage inertia
that do not arise in the economy with exible wages. We also study the growth
e¤ects of permanent technological and scal policy shocks in these two economies.
During the transition, the growth e¤ects of technological shocks obtained when
wages exhibit inertia may be the opposite from the ones obtained when wages are
exible. In the long run, these technological shocks may have long run e¤ects if
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scal policies will be
delayed when there is wage inertia.
JEL classication codes: O41.
Keywords: wage inertia, growth, e¢ ciency wages, transitional dynamics, unemploy-
ment.
Raurich, and Sorolla gratefully acknowledge nancial support from the Ministry of Science and In-
novation through grants ECO2009-06953 and ECO2009- 09847; and from the Generalitat de Catalunya
through grants 2009SGR-1051, 2009SGR-578 and the Barcelona GSE Research Network. We also thank
David de la Croix, Victor Montuenga and Fernando Sanchez-Losada for helpful comments.
yDepartament de Teoria Econòmica, Universitat de Barcelona, Avda. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona,
Spain; email: xavier.raurich@ub.edu; tel.: +34-93.402.19.34.
zDepartament dEconomia i dHistòria Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edici B,
08193 Bellaterra, Spain. tel.: +34-93.581.27.28. e-mail: valeri.sorolla@uab.cat.
1
1 Introduction
Wage inertia implies that current wages depend on past wages.1 This relationship is
a well-known empirical fact in labor economics (see Bell, 1996; Blanchard and Katz,
1997 and the survey by Montuenga-Gómez and Ramos-Parreño, 2005). Moreover, wage
inertia has been justied in di¤erent wage settings. In models of wage bargaining between
unions and rms, the wage is set as a markup over a reference wage that is interpreted
as a fall back position. This reference wage is typically related to the unemployment
benet. In most OECD countries, this unemployment benet depends on past wages. This
introduces the relationship between current and past wages (Burkhard and Morgenstern,
2000 and Beissinger and Egger, 2004). Wage inertia has also been justied in e¢ ciency
wage models, where the wage is set by the rm in order to make workers exert the
right amount of e¤ort (de la Croix and Collard, 2000; Danthine and Donaldson, 1990,
and Danthine and Kurmann, 2004). In this wage setting, the wage also depends on a
reference wage if fairness is introduced in the disutility of e¤ort of workers. This reference
wage is frequently interpreted as a social norm that depends on past wages. In this way,
wage inertia is introduced in the e¢ ciency wage model.
Wage inertia introduces a process of wage adjustment that drives the transitional
dynamics of wages and modies the time path of the other variables in the economy,
including the GDP growth rate. These di¤erences in the transitional dynamics have been
explored in New Keynesian models to explain facts of the business cycle and the e¤ects
of monetary shocks (Danthine and Kurmann, 2004; and Blanchard and Galí, 2007). In
contrast, wage inertia has almost not been introduced in growth models, even when a non
competitive labor market is assumed.2 Therefore, to study how wage inertia modies the
time path of the GDP growth rate is an open question. The purpose of this paper is to
address this question.
In order to study the growth e¤ects of wage inertia, we analyze a version of the
neoclassical one-sector exogenous growth model with e¢ ciency wages. In the model,
wages are set by the rms in order to make workers exert the right amount of e¤ort. These
non-walrasian wages cause non frictional unemployment. We assume that the workers
disutility of e¤ort depends on the comparison between current wages and an external
reference wage. Therefore, the amount of e¤ort exerted by the workers will depend on
1The literature also refers to wage inertia as persistence or sluggishness.
2Growth models with wage bargaining between rms and unions and non frictional unemployment have
been studied by Benassy (1997), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Braüninger (2000), Daveri and Mafezzoli
(2000), Doménech and García (2008) and growth models with e¢ ciency wages have been studied by Van
Shaik and de Groot (1998), Mekl (2004), Nakajima (2006), Brecher, Chen and Choudhri (2002) and
Pierpaolo (2010). In all these papers, wages do not exhibit inertia. Two exceptions that introduce wage
inertia in a growth model are the papers by Raurich, Sala and Sorolla (2006) and Greiner and Flaschel
(2010). However, these two papers only study the long run growth e¤ects of the interaction between wage
inertia and some particular scal policies.
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this comparison and then wages will be set by the rms in relation to this reference wage.
In this paper, this reference wage is interpreted as a social norm and it is dened as the
weighted average of past average labor income. It follows that current wages depend on
past wages, implying that wage inertia is introduced and that wages are a state variable.
Moreover, the weights in the weighted average that denes the social norm will determine
the intensity of wage inertia and, thus, the speed of wage adjustment. Therefore, in this
version of the neoclassical growth model, two forces drive the transition: rst, as in the
neoclassical growth model with full-employment, the diminishing returns to capital; and
second, the process of wage adjustment.
We distinguish two e¤ects of wage inertia. On the one hand, the time path of
the employment rate depends on both capital accumulation and the process of wage
adjustment. Capital accumulation increases the labor demand and, thus, increases
employment. Wage growth reduces employment. Thus, a fast (slow) accumulation of
capital in comparison to the speed of wage adjustment will imply an increase (decrease)
in the employment rate. Therefore, the interaction between capital accumulation and
wage adjustment can explain periods of fast employment creation and also non-monotonic
transitions of the employment rate that are not present when wages are exible.3
On the other hand, the returns on capital and wages are related because we assume
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Then, wage inertia modies the time
path of capital accumulation because it changes the returns on capital. In particular, if
wages are initially high then the interest rate will be initially low, implying low capital
accumulation. The opposite holds when wages are initially low. Moreover, a process of
fast wage adjustment also causes fast changes in capital accumulation.
During the transition, the GDP growth rate depends on the exogenous growth rate of
technology, capital accumulation and employment growth. As wage inertia modies both
capital accumulation and employment growth, the introduction of wage inertia modies
the GDP growth rate in a non-obvious way and causes non-monotonic transitions in this
variable. This non-monotonic transitions do not appear in the neoclassical growth model
with exible wages. In contrast, in the long run, the GDP growth rate coincides with the
exogenous growth rate of technology and, thus, it is independent of the process of wage
adjustment.
We use numerical simulations to study the e¤ects of wage inertia during the transition.
First, we show that in economies with initially high wage, the employment rate is initially
low and increasing. As a consequence, in these economies, the growth rate of GDP will be
initially large and decreasing during the transition. In contrast, initially low wages imply
that the employment rate will be initially high and decreasing during the transition. This
3By exible wages we mean that there is no wage inertia and, thus, current wages do not depend on
past wages. However, it does not mean that this exible wage clear the labor market and, hence, there
is full employment.
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implies that the growth rate of GDP will be initially low and it will increase during the
transition. We conclude that economies with the same initial stock of capital may exhibit
di¤erent time paths of the growth rate of GDP if initial wages are di¤erent. This suggests
that initial wages should be taken into account as a relevant variable in the empirical
analysis of convergence.
We also show that wage inertia can generate a process of fast employment creation
that may cause a non-monotonic transition of the GDP growth rate. Before this process
starts, GDP growth will be low. Then, during the process of employment growth, the
GDP growth rate will be large due to the increasing employment rate. Finally, when
the creation of employment ends, the GDP growth rate decreases until it converges to its
long run value. This non-monotonic transition implies that the log of the GDP exhibits a
S-shaped curve along the transition. This is a well-known fact of the development process
that the neoclassical growth model with exible wages fails to show.
We compare the growth e¤ects of technological shocks in the model with exible wages
and in the model with wage inertia. We consider two di¤erent technological shocks:
a permanent increase in the level of total factor productivity (TFP) and a permanent
increase in the growth rate of TFP. The rst shock only has transitional e¤ects on the
GDP growth rate. However, these e¤ects will depend on the intensity of wage inertia.
When wages are exible and transitional dynamics are driven only by diminishing returns
to capital, this shock initially increases the marginal product of capital and therefore the
GDP growth rate increases. When there is wage inertia, this shock implies an initially
decreasing path of the employment rate. This causes a negative e¤ect on GDP growth
that is not present when wages are exible. This negative growth e¤ect dominates the
positive growth e¤ect associated to capital accumulation during the rst periods and,
therefore, this shock initially reduces the GDP growth rate. Thus, a permanent increase
in the level of TFP causes an opposite transition of the GDP growth rate when there is
wage inertia.
The second shock, the permanent increase in the growth rate of TFP, implies a faster
growth of the marginal product of labor. Flexible wages adjust immediately to this faster
growth of the marginal product, implying that the employment rate does not change. In
contrast, when there is wage inertia, wages do not adjust to this faster growth of the
marginal product. As a consequence, when there is wage inertia, this technological shock
causes an increase in the employment rate both during the transition and in the long
run. Therefore, wage inertia introduces a positive relationship between the exogenous
long run growth rate and the long run employment rate. Note that, by interpreting the
productivity growth slowdown of the seventies as a reduction in the TFP growth rate,
this positive relationship explains the persistently high unemployment rates in Europe.
Finally, we study the growth e¤ects of the introduction of an unemployment benet.
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This unemployment benet rises the reference wage and, therefore, wages increase. If
wages are exible, they immediately adjust, implying an immediate jump downwards on
both employment and GDP. When there is wage inertia, wages do not immediately adjust
to this scal policy and, therefore, the employment rate and the level of GDP will su¤er
a slow decline. Thus, the macroeconomic e¤ects of this scal policy su¤er a delay when
wages exhibit inertia.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 denes
the equilibrium. Section 4 develops the numerical analysis that is used to study the
transitional dynamics when there is wage inertia. Section 5 contains some concluding
remarks.
2 The economy
In this section we rst describe the problem of the consumers; second, we introduce the
technology and the optimal decisions of the rms; and, nally, we specify a wage setting
rule with wage inertia.
2.1 Consumers
Consider an economy populated by Nt exante identical innitely lived consumers. Each
consumer chooses consumption, Ct, and e¤ort, e
f
t ; in order to maximize the discounted
sum of the utility
1Z
t=0
e ( n)t
h
u (Ct)  dtvt

eft
i
dt;
where  > 0 is the subjective discount rate, n  0 is the constant population growth rate,
dt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the consumer is employed and equals 0 if he is
unemployed. The utility function is separable in consumption and e¤ort. We assume that
u (Ct) is a twice continuously di¤erentiable utility function, increasing and concave that
satises the Inada conditions. We follow Akerlof (1982) and we introduce fairness in the
disutility of e¤ort. In particular, we assume the following functional form:
vt

eft

=

eft   ln

(1  )wtewst
2
;
where  is the labor income tax rate, wt is the wage, wst is an external reference wage ande > 0 is a preference parameter. Note that the consumers disutility of e¤ort decreases
if consumers feel that they are well paid, which happens when the wage net of taxes is
larger than the reference wage. Obviously, the disutility increases when consumers do not
consider that they are well paid.
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There is not a consensus in the literature on the determinants of the reference wage.
Layard et al. (1991, chapter 2) identies the reference wage with the average labor income.
Blanchard and Katz (1999) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) assume that the reference
wage also depends on past wages. We follow these authors and we interpret the reference
wage as a social norm that depends on the average past labor income in the economy. As
a consequence, it is external to the individual. This assumption is crucial as it implies
that consumers do not consider that their decisions today can modify the current or future
value of the reference wage.
In each period t a fraction of the consumers will be unemployed. As a consequence,
there is expost heterogeneity. To avoid the complexity associated with expost
heterogeneity, we follow Collard and de la Croix (2000) and we introduce unemployment
insurance contracts that are not a¤ected by transaction costs and that are o¤ered by
risk neutral insurance companies. Thus, risk avers consumers choose complete insurance
against the risk of being unemployed. This means that the income of employed and
unemployed consumers will coincide, implying that consumers are expost identical.4 If
consumers are employed, they obtain
Iet = (1  )wt  mt;
where mt is the cost of an unemployment insurance. If consumers are unemployed obtain
Iut = bt +
mt
1  lt  mt
where bt is the unemployment benet, mt1 lt is the unemployment insurance and lt is the
employment rate. The labor income of both employed and unemployed workers coincides
when the cost of the insurance is
mt = [(1  )wt   bt] (1  lt):
In this case, Iet = I
u
t = It; where It is the average labor income and it is dened as
5
It = (1  )wtlt + bt(1  lt):
4Collard and de la Croix (2000) show that this contract exists.
5Expost heterogeneity associated to unemployment can also be avoided by assuming that all members
of the economy belong to the same big familily. Daveri and Ma¤ezzoli (2000), Doménech and García
(2008), Eriksson (1997) follow this big family assumption. If instead of a big family we have heterogeneous
agents, the solution would not change as long as we assume complete competitive insurance markets for
unemployment or that a union pursues a redistributive goal, acting as a substitute for the insurance
markets (Ma¤ezzoli, 2001 and Benassy, 1997).
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Therefore, the budget constraint of the representative consumer is
_St = rtSt + It + Tt   Ct; (1)
where St is the stock of assets, It is the labor income and Tt is a lump-sum subsidy.
The consumer decides optimally on e¤ort, consumption and investment by maximizing
the discounted sum of utilities subject to the budget constraint. The solution of the
maximization problem of the consumers is characterized by the e¤ort function
eft = ln [(1  )wt]  ln (ewst ) ; (2)
the Euler condition
_Ct
Ct
=
rt   
 (Ct)
, (3)
where  (Ct) =
u00(Ct)Ct
u0(Ct) ; the budget constraint and the following transversality condition:
lim
t !1
e tu0 (Ct)St = 0: (4)
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of rms distributed in the interval [0; 1] : These rms produce using
the following neoclassical production function:
Yt = F (Kt; e
f
tAtLt),
where Yt is gross domestic product (GDP), Kt is capital, e
f
t is e¤ort, and AtLt are
e¢ ciency units of employed labor. We assume that technology, At; exogenously increases
at a constant growth rate x  0; and the production function satises the following
properties: constant returns to scale, twice continuously di¤erentiable, F1 > 0, F2 > 0,
F11 < 0, F22 < 0 and the Inada conditions.6 Note that e¤ort increases the productivity
of e¢ ciency units of labor. This is taken into account by rms that set wage contracts as
a partial gift exchange: workers in exchange of higher salaries will exert a higher amount
of e¤ort. Obviously, this non-walrasian wages will create unemployment in this model.
Firms take into account the e¤ort function when they maximize prots,
F (Kt; e
f
tAtLt)  wtLt   (rt + )Kt; where rt is the interest rate and  is the constant
depreciation rate  2 (0; 1). The rst order conditions with respect to capital, labor and
wages imply
rt = F1   ; (5)
6We dene F1 = @F@K , and F2 =
@F
@eftAtLt
:
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wt = e
f
tAtFL; (6)
and
@eft
@wt
wt
eft
= 1: (7)
The third equation is the Solow condition. From combining the e¤ort function and
the Solow condition, we obtain that eft = 1: Therefore, the optimal amount of e¤ort of
employed workers is constant through the transition. Using this constant e¤ort level and
the constant returns to scale assumption, (6) can be rewritten as
bwt = f bkt  bktf 0 bkt ; (8)
where bwt = wtAt is the wage per e¢ ciency units of labor, bkt = KAtLt is capital per
e¢ ciency units of employed labor and the production function in intensive form satises
the following properties: f 0 > 0 and f 00 < 0. Using (8), we get
bkt = ~k( bwt), (9)
where ~k0 > 0 and from (9) we obtain the labor demand function
Ldt =
Kt
At~k( bwt) . (10)
Combining (5) and (9), we obtain the zero prot condition as a function relating the
interest rate and wages
rt = f
0
h
~k ( bwt)i    er ( bwt) ; (11)
where er0 < 0: Thus, if the wage increases faster than e¢ ciency units of labor, the interest
rate decreases in order to have zero prots.
We assume that the labor supply is exogenous and equal to population, Nt: Population
grows at a constant rate n.7 Using the labor supply, we can dene GDP per e¢ ciency
units of labor (population) yt = YtAtNt , capital per e¢ ciency units of labor (population)
kt =
Kt
AtNt
and the employment rate lt = LtNt 2 [0; 1]. Moreover, we use the constant returns
to scale assumption to rewrite the production function as follows
yt = g(kt; lt).
In models with wage setting, factor markets do not clear if the wage is di¤erent from
the competitive walrasian wage. When the wage is smaller than the walrasian wage, there
is excess supply in the capital market and excess demand in the labor market; and if the
7Conclusions regarding the growth e¤ects of wage inertia would not be modied if an endogenous
labor supply had been assumed and leisure had been introduced additively in the utility function.
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wage is larger than the walrasian wage then there is excess demand in the capital market
and excess supply in the labor market. In this paper, we will consider the later case,
which implies that the equilibrium stock of capital is determined by the supply and the
equilibrium level of employment is determined by the labor demand, that is
Lt =
Kt
At~k( bwt) . (12)
Using (12), we obtain the employment rate function
lt = el( bwt; kt) = kt~k( bwt) . (13)
Note that the employment rate increases with the capital stock and decreases with the
wages per e¢ ciency unit. Finally, we use (13) to rewrite the ratio of GDP to capital as
the following decreasing function of wages:
yt
kt
= g(1;
1
~k( bwt)) = h
h
~k ( bwt)i , h0 < 0: (14)
2.3 Wage setting rule with inertia
We rst summarize the decisions of the consumers and rms to obtain two well-known
equations that make explicit the crucial role of wages in this model. To this end, we dene
ct =
Ct
At
as consumption per e¢ ciency units of labor, we use the equilibrium condition of
the capital market, St = Atkt; and we assume that the government budget constraint is
balanced in each period and equal to
Ltwt = NtTt + (Nt   Lt)bt:
Note that tax revenues are returned to the consumers as either a lump-sum transfer or as
an unemployment benet. Therefore, labor income taxes do not cause wealth e¤ects in
this economy.
Using equations (1), (3), (8), (11) and (14), the equilibrium condition in the capital
market and the government budget constraint, we obtain
_ct
ct
=
f 0
h
~k ( bwt)i        (ctAt)x
 (ctAt)
, (15)
and
_kt
kt
= h
h
~k ( bwt)i  ct
kt
  (n+ x+ ) . (16)
Equations (15) and (16) characterize the growth rates of consumption and capital
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per e¢ ciency units of labor. These equations depend on the time path of the wage per
e¢ ciency unit of labor. On the one hand, a higher wage reduces the interest rate and
causes a substitution e¤ect that deters future capital accumulation. On the other hand,
higher wages reduce the employment rate and, therefore, cause a negative wealth e¤ect
that reduces the rate of growth of capital. We conclude that the transitional dynamics of
the one sector growth model will depend on the particular assumptions regarding wage
setting. We can distinguish three di¤erent wage settings.
First, if wages are exible and they are set in order to clear the markets, there is
full-employment implying that lt = 1 and that ~k ( bwt) = kt: In this case, equations (15)
and (16) characterize the dynamic equilibrium of the standard neoclassical growth model
with full-employment.
Second, if wages are exible but they are set above the competitive wage, markets do
not clear and lt < 1: In this case, ~k ( bwt) = kt /lt ; where lt = el( bwt; kt) is dened in (13):
Obviously, the system of di¤erential equations (15) and (16) alone does not characterize
the dynamic equilibrium. The equilibrium will also depend on the wage equation obtained
from the wage setting and that determines the wage. The growth literature that studies
the joint dynamics of growth and unemployment has considered this framework of non-
walrasian wages without inertia. In this framework, the wage equation is static implying
that the equilibrium employment rate is either a function of capital or, under appropriate
assumptions regarding the wage setting, constant along the transition. In the later case,
the transitional dynamics are identical to the ones obtained in the standard version of the
neoclassical growth model with full-employment.
Finally, if wages exhibit inertia, there is an additional dynamic equation that governs
wage dynamics. In this paper we show that the transitional dynamics in this case are
di¤erent from the ones obtained when wages do not exhibit inertia and we outline that
these di¤erences can explain some facts of the growth process. We proceed to obtain the
wage equation.
In the e¢ ciency wage model considered in this paper, wages are set by the rm so
that workers exert the optimal amount of e¤ort, eft = 1: Using the e¤ort function (2), it
follows that wages set by the rm satisfy
wt =
wst
1   ; (17)
where  = ee  1: Note that a higher value of  implies that rms must pay a higher
wage in order to obtain the same amount of e¤ort. Regarding the reference wage, in this
paper we follow de la Croix and Collard (2000) and Raurich, et. al (2006) and assume
that the reference wage is a social norm that is dened as the following weighted average
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of past average labor income:
wst = w
s
0e
  t + 
Z t
0
e (t i)I (i) di; (18)
where ws0 is the initial value of the reference wage,  > 0 provides a measure of the wage
adjustment rate and It is the workersaverage labor income
It = (1  ) ltwt + (1  lt) bt; (19)
with the unemployment benets being bt =  (1  )wt and  2 (0; 1).
Note that a larger value of  reduces the weights given to the past and thus it implies
a lower wage inertia. Therefore,  provides a very convenient parametrization of the
speed of wage adjustment. Moreover, if  diverges to innite, the reference wage coincides
with the current average labor income and, in this limiting case, there is no wage inertia.
Therefore, we must distinguish between the limiting case in which  diverges to innite
and the case in which  takes a nite value.
If  diverges to innite, (18) simplies as follows: wst = It: We solve the system of
equations (17), (19) and wst = It to obtain that when wages do not exhibit inertia the
employment rate is constant and equal to
lt = 1 +
1  
 (1  )  l: (20)
An increase in the parameter  raises wages and thus reduces the employment rate. We
will assume that  2 [1; 1

) in order that l 2 (0; 1]. Note that there is full employment when
 = 1; whereas there is unemployment when  > 1: Note also that the employment rate
does not depend on the growth rate of the economy. In other words, it does not depend
on capital accumulation, nor technological progress. This result is a consequence of the
fact that the increase in wages crowds out completely the positive e¤ect on employment of
capital accumulation or technological progress when wages are exible. In the following
section, we show that this complete crowding out does not arise when wages exhibit
inertia.
If  takes a nite value, wages exhibit inertia implying that there is a process of wage
adjustment. To characterize this process, we rst obtain the law of motion of the reference
wage by di¤erentiating (18) with respect to time
_wst =  [It   wst ] : (21)
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Combining (17), (21) and (19), we obtain
_wst
wst
=  [ (1  ) lt +   1] :
We log-di¤erentiate (17) and bwt = wtAt and substitute the expression of the growth rate of
the reference wage to obtain the growth rate of wages per e¢ ciency unit of labor
bwtbwt =  [ (1  ) lt +   1]  x: (22)
Equation (22) is the dynamic wage equation of this model and it drives convergence in
the labor market. To see this, assume that the employment rate is initially large. As
a consequence, the average labor income is initially large implying that the reference
wage and wages will be larger in the future. As follows from (22), the growth of wages
will be initially large in this case. The fast growth of wages causes a reduction in the
employment rate. This reduction deters wage growth and makes wages per e¢ ciency unit
and employment converge to its long run value.
3 Equilibrium
We must distinguish between the equilibrium when  diverges to innite and wages are
exible and the equilibrium when wages exhibit inertia.
Denition 1 Given the initial condition k0; an equilibrium with exible wages is a path
fct; kt; bwt; ltg that solves the system of di¤erential equations (15) and (16), satises (20),
(13) and the transversality condition (4).
Denition 2 Given the initial conditions k0 and w0; an equilibrium with wage inertia is
a path fct; kt; bwt; ltg that solves the system of di¤erential equations (15), (16), and (22),
satises (13), and the transversality condition (4).
Note that the main di¤erence between these two equilibrium denitions is the number
of state variables.
In order to simplify the analysis and obtain results, we will assume the following
isoelastic utility function:
u (Ct) =
C1 t   1
1  
and the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = K

t

eftAtLt
1 
;  2 (0; 1) :
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With these assumptions, we obtain that  (ctAt) = ; ~k( bwt) =   bwt1  1 ; f 0 h~k ( bwt)i =

  bwt
1 
 1
 ; lt = kt
  bwt
1 
  1
 ; and h
h
~k ( bwt)i =   bwt1  1 : Therefore, the system of
di¤erential equations characterizing the equilibrium with wage inertia, (15), (16), and
(22), simplies as follows:
_ct
ct
=

  bwt
1 
 1
        x

, (23)
_kt
kt
=
 bwt
1  
 1

  ct
kt
  (n+ x+ ) ; (24)
and bwtbwt = 
 
 (1  ) kt
 bwt
1  
  1

+   1
!
  x: (25)
If wages are exible then lt = l. In this case, from (13), we obtain that the wage is
the following function of capital:
bwt = (1  )kt
l

:
Note that this implies that capital is the only state variable and the system of di¤erential
equations characterizing the equilibrium, (15) and (16), simplify as follows:
_ct
ct
=


kt
l
 1
       x

, (26)
and
_kt
kt
=

kt
l
 1
  ct
kt
  (n+ x+ ) : (27)
The equilibrium with exible wages is characterized by one control variable, ct; and
one state variable, kt: This equilibrium has a transition qualitatively equivalent to the
transition in the neoclassical growth model with full-employment because the employment
rate remains constant along the transition. In fact, the model is the neoclassical growth
model with full-employment (the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model) when  = 1:
We dene a steady state equilibrium as an equilibrium path along which bwt; ct; and kt
remain constant.
Proposition 3 There is a unique steady state equilibrium. The steady state values of the
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employment rate and of wages, capital, consumption and GDP per e¢ ciency unit satisfy
l = 1 +
1  
(1  )  +
x
(1  )  ;
bw = (1  ) + + x

 
 1
;
k =

 + + x

 1
 1
l;
c
k
=
 + + x

  (n+ x+ ) ;
y
k
=
 + + x

:
Note that the long run values of the ratios y
k
and c
k
and the wage bw do not depend on
the parameters characterizing the labor market. Thus, the equilibrium of the one sector
growth model converges to the same values of these variables regardless of the wage setting
assumed. However, the long run values of the employment rate and the levels of capital,
GDP and consumption per e¢ ciency units of population depend on both  and : On the
one hand, a larger value of  causes a reduction in the employment rate. This reduction
implies a decrease in the levels of capital, consumption and GDP. On the other hand, the
employment rate increases with x only if  takes a nite value. The parameter x measures
the long run growth rate of per capita GDP. Therefore, wage inertia introduces a positive
relationship between the long run values of the growth rate and of the employment rate
that is not present when wages are exible. The intuition is as follows. Sustained growth
implies that the labor demand increases at the growth rate x. Wage inertia prevents wages
to increase with the labor demand, which explains the positive e¤ect on the employment
rate. The same intuition explains that the employment rate decreases with the speed
of wage adjustment, ; when there is sustained growth. This result contributes to the
literature that analyzes the long run relationship between growth and employment in
di¤erent wage settings and in di¤erent growth models. This literature has proposed
di¤erent mechanisms explaining a positive (or negative) relationship between these two
variables. In this paper, we show that wage inertia is another mechanism relating growth
with employment in the long run.
Proposition 4 The steady state equilibrium of the economy with wage inertia is locally
saddle path stable.
This result shows that there is a unique dynamic equilibrium. In the following section
we show how wage inertia a¤ects the transitional dynamics along this unique equilibrium.8
8Given that we have a two dimensional manifold, there are two roots with a negative real part. In
the numerical example of the following section, the roots are complex numbers when  is su¢ ciently low.
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4 Numerical analysis
When wages are exible, transitional dynamics are governed by the diminishing returns
to capital and, thus, they only depend on the initial value of capital per e¢ ciency units
of labor. In contrast, when there is wage inertia, transitional dynamics are governed by
both the diminishing returns to capital and wage dynamics. In this case, transitional
dynamics will depend on the initial conditions on both capital and wages per e¢ ciency
units of labor. The existence of two di¤erent forces driving the transition implies that the
dynamic equilibrium will exhibit relevant di¤erences with respect to the equilibrium path
of a model with exible wages. In this section, we compare these di¤erent transitional
dynamics by means of a numerical analysis. Therefore, the value of the parameters must
be xed.
We assume that  = 2 which implies a value of the IES = 0:5 and  = 0:35 which
implies a constant value of the labor income share equal to 0:65. We x x = 2% and
n = 1%; which are within the range of empirically plausible values of these two parameters.
The depreciation rate  = 6:46% implies a long run net interest rate equal to 5:2% and
the subjective discount rate  = 0:012 implies that the long run ratio of capital to GDP
equals 3. We assume that there is no unemployment benet in the benchmark economy,
 = 0; and the value of  is set so that the long run employment rate equals l = 0:9: As 
is used to calibrate the long run value of the employment rate, this parameter will take a
di¤erent value in the economy with exible wages and in the economy with wage inertia.
In particular,  = 1:22 in the economy with wage inertia and  = 1:11 in the economy
with exible wages. Finally, the parameter  determines the speed of wage adjustment.9
We set the value of  equal to 0:2; which implies an intensity of wage inertia that makes
half distance in wages be satised in only three periods.10
In what follows, we show the results of four selected numerical exercises aimed to
illustrate the transitional dynamics when there is wage inertia and compare the growth
e¤ects of shocks in an economy with exible wages and in an economy with wage inertia.
In the numerical examples we use the relaxation algorithm proposed by Trimborn, Koch
and Steger (2008) to obtain the transition in a two-dimensional stable manifold.
This implies that for a su¢ ciently high intensity of wage inertia the equilibrium exhibits oscillations.
In the examples of the following section, we assume a value of  such that the roots are real numbers.
Therefore, the non-monotonic behavior of the variables will be just a consequence of the existence of two
di¤erent forces driving the transition.
9The value of  could be calibrated using the autoregressive coe¢ cient in the estimated wage equations.
However, there is not a consensus on the value of this coe¢ cient in the empirical labor literature (see
Montuenga and Ramos-Parreño, 2005). The value of the parameter  used in the simulation exercises
would imply a conservative value of the autoregressive coe¢ cient equal to 0:82.
10Half distance is dened as bw  bw0bw  bw0 = 12 ; where  is the number of periods needed to satisfy half
distance.
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4.1 Transitional dynamics
In a rst numerical exercise, Figure 1 compares the transitional dynamics of two economies
with the same initial capital stock, which is 5% larger than the long run capital stock,
and a di¤erent initial wage. Therefore, this numerical exercise is aimed to show how the
initial conditions on wages modify the transitional dynamics. The economy described by
the continuous line has an initial wage that is 1% smaller than the long run wage and
the economy illustrated by the dashed line has an initial wage that is 5% larger than its
long run value. The rst two panels show the time path of the two state variables: wages
and capital per e¢ ciency units. The third panel shows the time path of the interest rate.
This time path of the interest rate follows from (11). This equation implies a negative
relationship between wages per e¢ ciency units of labor and the interest along the growth
process. Panel (iv) displays the time path of the employment rate. Equation (13) shows
that the path of the employment rate is completely determined by the path of capital and
wages per e¢ ciency units of labor. As capital accumulates, the labor demand increases
and so does the employment rate. However, an increase in wages reduces the employment
rate. Thus, the two forces driving the transition have opposite e¤ects on employment,
which may cause a non-monotonic behavior in the time path of this variable. To see
this, consider the economy with initially low wages and high capital stock described by
the continuous line. On the one hand, the low wages explain the initially large value of
the interest rate. This explains the initial increase in the capital stock. On the other
hand, the initially large capital stock and the low wages imply that the employment rate
is initially high. Obviously, this high employment rate makes the current average income
be large, which causes the increase in the reference wage and, thus, wages per e¢ ciency
unit raise. The increase in wages per e¢ ciency unit explains both the reduction in the
employment rate and also the reduction in the interest rate during the rst periods. The
later explains the reduction in the capital stock. Therefore, the interaction between the
labor market and the interest rate explains the non-monotonic time path of the capital
stock. Moreover, the reduction in the employment rate decreases the growth of wages per
e¢ ciency unit and, eventually, wages decrease. The reduction in wages implies that the
employment rate will nally increase and, therefore, the time path of this variable also
exhibits a non-monotonic transition (see panel iv).
Panels v) and vi) display, respectively, the time path of the growth rate of per capita
GDP and the logarithm of per capita GDP. We use the production function to obtain the
logarithm of per capita GDP as the following function:
lnGDP = a+  ln k + (1  ) ln l + xt;
where a is a constant. In the long run, the logarithm of GDP is a linear function of
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time implying a constant long run growth rate equal to x: However, during the transition,
both the accumulation of capital and the growth of the employment rate determine the
time path of the GDP growth rate. In the economy illustrated by the continuous line,
the employment rate is initially high and su¤ers a process of fast reduction. The high
employment rate explains the initially large level of per capita GDP and the fast reduction
in employment explains the initially low growth rate of GDP.
The dashed line in Figure 1 illustrates the transitional dynamics of an economy that
has the same initial capital stock but an initially larger wage. The transitional dynamics
of this economy are the opposite from the ones obtained in the economy with initially low
wages. In particular, the growth rate of GDP decreases in the economy with initially high
wages, whereas increases in the other economy. We then conclude that economies with
the same initial capital stock but di¤erent initial wages exhibit di¤erent time paths of
the GDP growth rate. Therefore, the initial cost of labor is a relevant variable explaining
convergence and this variable should then be taken into account by the empirical growth
literature when analyzing convergence.
In Figure 2, we show that di¤erences in wage inertia also cause large di¤erences in
transitional dynamics. We compare two economies with the same initial conditions, but
di¤erent assumptions on wage inertia. In the economy characterized by the continuous
line we assume that  = 0:2; whereas the dashed line shows the time path of the variables
when there is no wage inertia, i.e.  !1. In both economies the initial stock of capital
per e¢ ciency units of labor is 50% smaller than its long run value and the initial wage in
the economy with wage inertia is set so that wages per e¢ ciency unit in the initial period
coincide in both economies. The main di¤erences are in the time paths of the employment
rate (panel iv) and of the growth rate of GDP (panel v). In the economy with exible
wages, the employment rate is constant and the transition of the growth rate is driven only
by the diminishing returns to capital. In the economy with wage inertia, capital increases
faster than wages in the initial periods, implying an increase in the employment rate. As
a consequence, the reference wage increases, which accelerates the process of wage growth.
This implies that the employment rate eventually decreases until it converges to its long
run value. While the employment rate increases, the growth rate of GDP is larger than
that of the economy with exible wages, whereas it is smaller when the employment rate
decreases. This implies a fast and sharp transition of the GDP growth rate in the economy
with wage inertia. Note also that we can explain large values of the GDP growth rates
with plausible values of the interest rate and of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
that can not be explained when wages are exible. Therefore, the introduction of wage
inertia can explain the observed large GDP growth rate in emerging economies.
Figure 3 illustrates the transitional dynamics of two economies with di¤erent initial
conditions and di¤erent wage inertia. The continuous line shows the time path of the
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variables of an economy with wage inertia ( = 0:08) ; an initial capital stock per e¢ ciency
unit that is 25% smaller than its long run value and an initial wage per e¢ ciency unit
that is 10% larger that its long run value. The dashed line shows the time path of the
variables of an economy with exible wages and an initial capital stock per e¢ ciency unit
that is 25% smaller than its long run value. In the economy with exible wages, the
employment rate is constant and equal to its long run value. Given that the stock of
capital per e¢ ciency unit is initially low, the interest rate will be large. This initially
large interest rate causes a fast capital accumulation, which explains the increasing time
path of wages per e¢ ciency unit and the decreasing time path of the interest rate. The
time path of the interest rate explains the time path of the growth rate, which is initially
large and then, during the transition, it decreases until it converges to it long run value.
Thus, the growth rate exhibits a monotonic transition.
The economy with wage inertia exhibits a completely di¤erent transition. The
initially large value of wages per e¢ ciency unit implies that the initial value of both
the employment rate and the interest rate are initially low. On the one hand, the low
interest rate implies that capital per e¢ ciency unit decreases in the initial periods. As
capital decreases, the interest rate increases and, eventually, capital increases. On the
other hand, wages decrease because of the low employment rate. The reduction of wages
causes the growth of employment during the initial periods of the transition. In these
initial periods, the growth of employment is partially compensated by the reduction in
capital per e¢ ciency unit and thus the growth rate of GDP is low. During the transition,
when capital starts accumulating and still there is employment growth, the GDP growth
rate increases. Finally, the process of employment and capital growth ends, which implies
a decrease in the growth rate of GDP. Note that the time path of the growth rate of
GDP exhibits a non-monotonic behavior along the growth process. This non-monotonic
behavior implies that the time path of the log of GDP exhibits a S-shaped curve.
S-shaped curves are a well-known fact of the development process, implying that
initially the GDP growth rate is low and when the development process starts it exhibits
a period of fast growth that eventually stops. The neoclassical growth model with no
wage inertia fails to show this type of transition and thus fails to explain the development
process.11 In this paper, we show that a version of the neoclassical growth model with
wage inertia explains this non-monotonic transition as the result of labor market dynamics.
Obviously, the model in this paper is too simple to be a serious theory of development.
However, it suggests that labor market dynamics driven by wage inertia could be a relevant
part of a development theory.
11Recent growth literature has developed models aimed to explain this behavior. Examples are
the endogenous preferences literature (Alonso-Carrera, et al., 2005 and Steger, 2006) and models of
technological change (Parente and Prescott, 1999).
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4.2 Technological and scal policy shocks
In this subsection we compare the transitional dynamics implied by two di¤erent
technological shocks and a scal policy shock. In the gures, the continuous line illustrates
the transitional dynamics in our benchmark economy with wage inertia and the dashed
line shows the transitional dynamics of an economy with exible wages. In the examples
of this subsection we assume that the economies before the shock are initially in the steady
state.
Figure 4 shows the transitional dynamics implied by a permanent technological shock
that increases the level of TFP by a 5%. In the economy with exible wages, this shock
causes an initial increase in the interest rate. The increase in the interest rate implies
that the capital stock per e¢ ciency units of labor, after the initial reduction due to
the increase in the e¢ ciency units, increases during the transition. This explains both
the increasing time path of wages per e¢ ciency unit and the decreasing time path of
the interest rate. Note that the time path of the interest rate explains both the initial
increase in the GDP growth rate and also the decreasing time path of this variable along
the transition. The e¤ects of this shock are completely di¤erent in the economy with wage
inertia. In this economy, the shock does not initially increase the wage. As a consequence,
the wage per e¢ ciency units of labor initially su¤ers a strong reduction. This has two
e¤ects. First, the increase in the interest rate will be larger when there is wage inertia,
implying a faster accumulation of capital. Second, the employment rate will initially jump
upwards, as wages initially remain constant and the marginal product of labor increases.
As a consequence, the average labor income of the economy increases. This causes the
increase in wages per e¢ ciency unit and the reduction in the employment rate during
the transition. The reduction of employment has a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of
GDP. Thus, the growth rate of GDP will be driven by two di¤erent and opposite e¤ects:
the reduction in the employment rate and the increase in the capital stock. Given our
assumption of low wage inertia, the employment rate will experience a process of fast
reduction, implying that this e¤ect initially dominates the transition. This explains the
reduction in the growth rate of GDP after the positive technological shock. Note that the
growth e¤ects of this technological shock are the opposite from the ones obtained when
wages do not exhibit inertia.
Figure 5 shows the transitional dynamics implied by a permanent technological shock
that increases the exogenous growth rate from 2% to 3%. In the economy with exible
wages, the employment rate is constant and the transitional dynamics will be governed
only by the diminishing returns to capital. The growth rate increases along the transition
until it converges to its new long run value. As explained in Proposition 3, this shock
has permanent e¤ects on the employment rate in the economy with wage inertia. This
is a consequence of the positive relationship between growth an employment introduced
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by wage inertia. Therefore, the employment rate increases until it converges to its new
steady state. Obviously, this permanent e¤ects on employment also imply permanent
e¤ects on the levels of GDP and capital that are not present when wages are exible.
The purpose of presenting these two exercises is to show the relevant consequences of
assuming wage inertia in understanding the short and long run e¤ects of technological
shocks. As an illustrative example of this, consider the productivity slowdown of the
seventies that most western economies su¤er. If we interpret this slowdown as a permanent
reduction of the exogenous growth rate then, according to a model with exible wages, it
will not have long run e¤ects on the employment rate, whereas it will cause a permanent
reduction in the employment rate in an economy with wage inertia. This suggests that
the di¤erent long run e¤ects on the labor market that this shock had in the European
and US economies could be explained by a di¤erent intensity of wage inertia.
Figure 6 shows the transitional dynamics implied by the introduction of an
unemployment benet,  = 1=3. This scal rises the current average income and thus
increases wages. In the economy with exible wages, this causes an initial jump upwards in
wages per e¢ ciency unit that has two di¤erent e¤ects. On the one hand, the employment
rate decreases, which implies a reduction in GDP. On the other hand, the interest rate
decreases which causes the reduction of capital per e¢ ciency units of labor during the
transition. The reduction in the capital stock explains the lower growth rate during the
transition. In the economy with wage inertia, wages do not jump after the introduction of
the unemployment benet. As a consequence, the interest rate does not initially decrease,
nor does the employment rate. This implies that the level of GDP remains constant after
the introduction of the unemployment benet. However, during the initial periods of the
transition, wages will experience a process of rapid growth that reduces both the interest
rate and the employment rate. As a consequence, the stock of capital decreases during
the transition. The combined e¤ect of the reduction in the stock of capital per e¢ ciency
units of labor and in the employment rate explains the larger reduction in the growth rate
and the time path of the log of per capita GDP. This example shows that wage inertia
delays the macroeconomics e¤ects of this scal policy. We conjecture that this conclusion
could be generalized to any scal policy that a¤ects the economy by increasing wages.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we develop a version of the neoclassical growth model with wage inertia.
We use this model to compare the equilibrium with wage inertia with the equilibrium of
another economy with exible wages. We show that these economies exhibit very di¤erent
transitional dynamics.
We study the transitional dynamics using selected numerical exercises. In a rst
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exercise, we show that economies with the same initial capital stock may exhibit opposite
transitions of the GDP growth rates because of di¤erent values of the initial wage. We
conclude that wages should be considered in the empirical analysis of convergence.
In a second exercise, we compare the transitional dynamics in an economy with wage
inertia and in an economy with exible wages. In the economy with exible wages, the
time path of the macroeconomic variables exhibits a monotonic behavior, while we show
that this time path can be non-monotonic when wage inertia is introduced. We argue
that this non-monotonic transition is a consequence of the interaction between two forces:
diminishing returns to capital and the process of wage adjustment. We show that this non-
monotonic transition may imply that the time path of the logarithm of per capita GDP
exhibits a S-shaped curve. This suggests that a closer analysis of labor market dynamics
when wages exhibit inertia could explain some facts of the development process.
In a third exercise, we study the transitional dynamics implied by two di¤erent
technological shocks: a permanent increase in the level of TFP and a permanent increase
in the TFP growth rate. We show that the e¤ects of the rst shock on the growth rate
of GDP will be the opposite if wage inertia is introduced. We also show that the second
shock has permanent e¤ects on employment and on the level of GDP only when wages
exhibit inertia. We conclude that wage inertia crucially changes the e¤ects of technological
shocks.
Finally, in a last numerical exercise, we study the e¤ects of a scal policy that consists
of introducing an unemployment benet. We show that wage inertia causes a delay on
the e¤ects of this scal policy.
The introduction of wage inertia does not modify the long run GDP growth rate
because it is exogenous in this model. The aim of future research is to extend this analysis
of wage inertia to endogenous growth models. In these models, the long run growth rate
of GDP is endogenously determined by the fundamentals of the economy and, therefore,
it may depend on the intensity of wage inertia.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4 The Jacobian matrix associated to (23), (24) and (25) is
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The characteristic polynomial is
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where the inequality follows from the bounded utility condition. Given that H > 0 and
Det (J) > 0, the equilibrium is saddle path stable regardless of the sign of the trace.
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Figures
Figure 1. Transitional Dynamics: di¤erent initial conditions
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Figure 2. Transitional Dynamics: di¤erent wage inertia
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Figure 3. Transitional Dynamics: di¤erent wage inertia and initial conditions
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Figure 4. Permanent increase in the level of TFP
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Figure 5. Permanent increase in the long run growth rate
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Figure 6. Unemployment benet
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